



# President & CEO Update

**Doug Buresh**

May 28, 2020

- **May 4, 2020**
- **KYMEA FY2021  
Rate Reduction**
- **COVID-19 Rate  
Relief Plan (RRP)**
- **Member Late  
Payment  
Protection Plan  
(LPPP)**








# KYMEA COVID-19 Load Forecast Adjustment

## Kentucky COVID-19 Re-openings

- May 11: Office Businesses (50%)
- May 20: Retail (33%)
- May 22: Restaurants (33%)
- June 1: Movie Theaters
- June 8: Outdoor Attractions
- June 15: Youth Sports
- June 29: Bars, groups of 50 or less

<https://govstatus.egov.com/ky-healthy-at-work>



# COVID-19 Industry News

## Discussion

### ❑ Article regarding lost COVID-19 Revenues

***Headline - Indiana utilities seeking permission to charge customers to recover revenue lost due to pandemic***

- **A group of 10 Indiana utility companies is seeking permission to charge customers in an attempt to recover revenue lost during the COVID-19 pandemic.**
- **Pandemic has resulted in significantly reduced load and revenues for some utilities.**

[https://energycentral.com/news/indiana-utilities-seeking-permission-charge-customers-recover-revenue-lost-due-pandemic?utm\\_medium=eNL&utm\\_campaign=DAILY\\_NEWS&utm\\_content=501143&utm\\_source=2020\\_05\\_18](https://energycentral.com/news/indiana-utilities-seeking-permission-charge-customers-recover-revenue-lost-due-pandemic?utm_medium=eNL&utm_campaign=DAILY_NEWS&utm_content=501143&utm_source=2020_05_18)

**Opposite approach of KYMEA. KYMEA is supporting its members and their customers by assuming the impact of lost revenue. The IOUs are seeking permission to recover the lost revenue.**

# Industry News – PJM Capacity Market

## Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR)

- ❑ **Issue: Certain PJM States are offering subsidies for nuclear, wind, and solar.**
- **Providing subsidies lowers the PJM resource planning auction (PRA) clearing prices.**
  - **The generators who receive the subsidies have two capacity revenue streams (state subsidy + PJM capacity market).**
  - **This enables subsidized generators to bid lower than cost recovery since they receive a subsidy.**



*To address this issue, FERC issued a minimum offer price rule (MOPR)  
December 19, 2019*



# How the PJM Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) Works

- Generators offer their generation into the auction at an offer price.
- This creates an offer curve.
- The intersection of the demand with the offer curve sets the market clearing price.
- The prices can vary by capacity region due to capacity import/export constraints.

*Capacity Market Opt Out: PJM allows utilities to opt out via Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) if they can serve power demand with their own generation resources.*



# What are the Subsidies?

## Subsidies (aka Out-Of-Market Solutions)

### ➤ Nuclear Power

- Zero Emission Credits (ZECs)
- Preserve nuclear industry jobs
- Political influence (Illinois lobbying scandal)

<https://energynews.us/2019/11/06/midwest/illinois-lobbying-scandal-rattles-alliance-backing-state-clean-energy-legislation>

### ➤ Wind and Solar


- Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs)
- Political influence



# PJM Generators with Out-Of-Market Payments

## PJM MARKETPLACE FACES WIDESPREAD IMPACTS FROM FERC'S MOPR ORDER

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued an order December 19 (EL 16-49, EL 18-178) designed to combat the potential price-suppressing effects of subsidized resource participation in PJM Interconnection's capacity market by expanding application of the minimum offer price rule (MOPR) to all new and existing resources in PJM that are eligible to receive state subsidies. Renewable projects close to interconnection are exempt from the MOPR and could clear in the next auction, but there is uncertainty regarding renewable energy project competitiveness longer-term for non-exempt projects. The proceeding continues to unfold and the ultimate impact on state-subsidized resources is still being determined.



Sources: PJM, S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Global Platts; PJM Interconnection Queue



# Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) Floor Table

**\*\*\* *FERC has not yet approved the MOPR Floor Table***

TABLE 1. *Changing proposed default bid levels for relevant resources*

| RESOURCE TYPE                  | PRELIMINARY IMM-<br>RECOMMENDED DEFAULT BID<br>LEVEL \$/MW-DAY <sup>15</sup> | PJM 2018 FILING<br>DEFAULT BID LEVEL \$/<br>MW-DAY <sup>16</sup> | PJM MARCH 2020<br>COMPLIANCE FILING<br>DEFAULT BID LEVEL<br>\$/MW-DAY <sup>17</sup> |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Existing Nuclear - Single Unit | \$179.79                                                                     | \$631                                                            | \$210                                                                               |
| Existing Nuclear - Dual Unit   | \$0                                                                          | \$593                                                            | \$0                                                                                 |
| New Hydro                      | NA                                                                           | \$1,066                                                          | NA                                                                                  |
| New Pumped Hydro               | NA                                                                           | NA                                                               | NA                                                                                  |
| New Solar PV (Tracking)        | \$532.07                                                                     | \$387                                                            | \$175                                                                               |
| New Solar PV (Fixed)           |                                                                              |                                                                  | \$367                                                                               |
| New Onshore Wind               | 443.89                                                                       | \$2,489                                                          | \$1,023                                                                             |
| New Offshore Wind              | \$1,741.83                                                                   | \$4,327                                                          | \$3,146                                                                             |

For reference, the capacity market clearing price for the most recent PJM auction was \$140/MW-day, with some zones within PJM clearing at higher prices between \$165.73/MW-day and \$204.29/MW-day.<sup>18</sup> With very few exceptions, the allowed renewable bids are above these clearing prices.


Source: Grid Strategies | May 2020

# MOPR Floor Impact on Capacity Markets

## PJM Electricity Capacity Market:


Before and after changes to the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR)

### Before changes to MOPR



With state-supported sources like solar and wind offering low-cost electricity generation capability in PJM's capacity market, the clearing price that all sources get paid for capacity is set lower, which helps keep capacity costs down.

### After changes to MOPR



Capacity costs from state-supported resources are artificially inflated by a requirement that they offer at or above a high "minimum price." This restricts market competition and raises the clearing price, increasing costs for consumers.

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# APPA's Response

APPA: The MOPR Floor means that every new resource built in the future—whether it is a renewable, storage, or energy efficiency resource—will run the risk of not clearing the capacity auction (even after they have initially cleared an auction), causing public power utilities and their customers to face the risk of paying twice for that resource every year.



[https://www.publicpower.org/node/18325?MessageRunDetailID=1861557592&PostID=15235474&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=rasa\\_io](https://www.publicpower.org/node/18325?MessageRunDetailID=1861557592&PostID=15235474&utm_medium=email&utm_source=rasa_io)

# Why This Matters to KYMEA

- The Falmouth load is in PJM
  - In the future, it is possible KYMEA's load could be in PJM if LG&E/KU joins PJM.
  - The FERC ruling for PJM sets precedent for other RTO's such as MISO.
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- Further, as the baseload retirements continue to mount, ensuring resource adequacy coupled with intermittent resources (wind and solar) will need to be addressed by FERC.

**ENSURING  
RESOURCE  
ADEQUACY  
ON A  
CHANGING  
GRID**

